



No-proliferación para la Seguridad Global
Nonproliferation for Global Security

International Seminar

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament - The Future of the NPT

Rio de Janeiro, October 29 and 30, 2009

Full audio transcription *

Quotes in Portuguese translated into English

Keynote Speaker Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte Perspectives for an increase in accountability and transparency through international mechanisms for nonproliferation

October 29, 2009

Marcos de Azambuja: -It is a responsibility but also a pleasure to introduce our keynote speaker. This afternoon's Keynote Speaker, the Ambassador Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte, High Commissioner, High Representative for Disarmament of the Secretary General of United Nations. I have in front of me Ambassador Sergio Duarte's abbreviated curriculum, but I will abbreviate the abbreviation because it is a long record of service: he served as Ambassador of Brazil in Nicaragua, Canada, China, and Austria. He chaired the 2005 session of the meeting that attempted to review the Non Proliferation Treaty. He has a long tradition of service in the area of disarmament. He integrated the Conference of Disarmament when it was the ENDC, the Eighty Nations Disarmament Conference. So, it is a long history of loyalty to a good cause, and loyalty to those permanent interests of safeguarding the international peace and security. He also has a long tradition of cooperative action of Brazil at the IAEA.

Therefore, he is immensely qualified to be our Keynote Speaker this afternoon. And I even expect more of him, the hope is placed upon him, that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can see a substantial progress. He was the Chair of the 2005 Review Conference, but under those conditions, even his effort and talent were incapable of bringing about a change that the powers of that time did not want.

From a personal point of view, I have been Sergio Duarte's friend for literally more than 50 years. We were classmates, we shared the same bench at school, colleagues at the diplomatic academy, and since then we have a friendship that I would not hesitate to define as exemplary. It is intense, symmetric, and reciprocal. Consequently, it is with great pleasure that I give him the pulpit and I congratulate this Seminar for bringing him back to Rio. It has been a while since Sergio came here and this was a pretext to bring him back to his hometown. So, I give the floor to the High Representative of the UN Secretary General for Disarmament: Sergio de Queiroz Duarte. Thank you.

Sergio de Queiroz Duarte: -Thank you, thank you very much Ambassador Azambuja. I think what he meant is that I'm almost his age, but the truth is that he is a little bit younger than I am, I must confess, (but only for some months) [with humor]. I see that in this audience besides from representatives of other countries, speakers, diplomats, and others, I see that there are many young persons. I know they are all students and scholars of international relations, most of them with master degrees, or in postgraduate courses. I noticed that when several of the speakers spoke in English or Spanish very few among the young people here were wearing the headphones. Therefore, I will allow myself not to use the Portuguese language. I think it would be better for most of the audience, including the Brazilians, that I use the language in which I wrote these words. I handed in to the translators a text in Portuguese, so certainly they will deliver a great service. I am also a translator; I translate poetry in general which is a little bit harder than translating speeches.

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Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished colleagues, and participants. I wish first of all to thank CEBRI, especially Ambassador Botafogo and his colleagues, and the NPSGlobal Foundation for organizing the Seminar. For me it's a great honor to be here, with friends and colleagues from a long time, in this city where I was born, to address issues that would shape the future of the Nuclear Non proliferation Treaty, which is one of the world's most important multilateral instruments.

The importance of the NPT relates both to the many benefits it offers, for strengthening international peace and security, as well as to the dangers that the world community will face if any, and I repeat, any of the Treaties three great goals of disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses failed to be achieved. And I emphasize the word "any" because these goals have not been called "the 3 pillars" for nothing. Together they constitute an indivisible goal, they represent the very essence of the Treaty. Each goal is as important to the Treaty as the heart, the brain and the lungs are to the human body. If they work together, they sustain life, if they are neglected, they jeopardize life, and if they are removed, they end life. The principle here is not difficult to understand: the future of the Treaty will not be determined nearly by its effectiveness in halting proliferation if the other goals are left to atrophy.

Fortunately, the states parties to the NPT are well aware of the neutrally reinforcing nature of these goals. They recognized long ago that the behavior of state parties must be closely assessed in relation to their commitments under the Treaty. This basic idea ultimately derives from article 8 of the Treaty, which, provided by the conference of the parties and according to the Treaty, with the view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the treaty are being realized.

The state parties attending the 1995 NPT Review, and extension conference, certainly attach great importance to these Review Conferences. Decision 1 of the Conference established that those Conferences of Review will continue to occur every 5 years, and that the Preparatory Committee sessions, leading up to them, should, in accord with the Decision, consider principles, objectives, and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations of their own to the Review Conference. Indeed, if there was one central thing of that Conference in 1995, it was captured in the phrase "permanence with accountability".

The 2000 NPT Review Conference further strengthened the process in significant ways, while also agreed on 13 steps on nuclear disarmament. Step number 12 provided for regular reports, by all states parties, to the implementation of nuclear disarmament responsibilities, while recognizing that disarmament must proceed, and again I quote, in the way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all. Step number 9, provided for increased transparency, by the nuclear weapon states, with regards of their nuclear weapon capabilities, and the implementation of agreements pursuing article 6.

I view these various developments relating to reporting and transparency in the disarmament process, as both good policy and a fundamental reflection, of a sense of fairness and equity among all state parties. However, from many years, the Treaty's non nuclear weapon states have been confronting more inclusive types of safeguards and persistent difficulties relating to export control of technologic transfers, over items required for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In their official statements and papers presented throughout the NPT Review Process, various governments have offered some creative proposals on how state parties can enhance transparency through the review process. Canada, for one, has proposed standardizing the Treaty's reporting requirements; Germany has proposed a nuclear weapons register, a global inventory of fissile materials and reporting, by Russia and the United States, on the implementation of the 1991/ 92 presidential nuclear initiative, which limited deployments of non strategic nuclear weapons. I strongly believe that the goal of these various transparency proposals is sound. They are not intended to embarrass the nuclear weapon states, or to bring pressure on them. They instead offer a useful means for the nuclear weapon states to show in a systematic and credible

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way what they are actually doing to implement their disarmament commitments under the Treaty. This was the spirit behind Brazil's proposal in 2004, for the United Nation Secretariat, to maintain a comparative table summarizing the progress the nuclear weapon states have cited in their various interventions at the NPT Preparatory Committee sessions and other forums.

On 24th of October 2008, the Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon, included elements of accountability and transparency, as the 4th of his 5 Point Plan for Disarmament. He specifically called upon the nuclear weapon states to circulate descriptions of their achievements in the field of disarmament, and invited them to send such material to the United Nations Secretariat and to encourage wider dissemination.

Some, of course, may dispute that there is any need for increase transparency, when it comes to the worlds existing nuclear weapons. Perhaps the best indicator of such a need is offered by the lack of answer to a very simple question: how many nuclear weapons exist? Nobody seems to know, and if they know, they are not saying. Instead, the world has to rely upon estimates provided by non governmental experts, based on fragmentary information, extracted from official publications. There is a similar problem with capacity, with respect to the production and stockpiling of fissile material, even recognizing that some states have published some data on this question.

Let me say here that transparency is not a dispensable option for insuring accountability under the Treaty. Both respect the nonproliferation, and for disarmament commitments or both, as well as for peaceful uses. If there is a little or no transparency, how are the state parties supposed to assess progress in achieving the goals of the Treaty? Basic facts about weapons production, stockpiles, and holdings of fissile materials are absolutely essential in the establishment of a baseline from where to assess progress in disarmament. Without such facts, how is the whole confidence building function of transparency could be achieved?

If states are to rely exclusively upon discretionary reporting on progress in disarmament, then no grounds of strict standards are applied to assess compliance with nonproliferation. Any Treaty that applies an opacity standard to some of it parties and a full transparency standard for the rest will inevitably encounter difficulties. One might ask, as that is the title of the Seminar, what can be done to address and eliminate such difficulties, to me the answer is clear: all state parties must build on what they have already achieved. The nuclear weapon states have already agreed for the 2000 NPT Review Conference, to increase transparency, with regards to their weapon capabilities. And this offers more than adequate bases for making public fundamental statistics above the aggregated size of arsenals and holdings of fissile materials.

The states should also avoid referring to nuclear weapons as essential, or as a vital necessity, or extolling the virtues of nuclear deterrence, for such references have already been copied by too many states. I'm also concerned by the prevailing practice of itemizing lengthy preconditions for future progress in nuclear disarmament. This will only invite a predictable response from the nonnuclear weapon states and they will come up with parallel, lengthy lists of preconditions for fulfilling nonproliferation obligations. This is a very old game; one that Albert Myrdal once said "has no winners". Of course, when I say state parties should build on what they have already achieved, I also mean that they should build a recent progress.

Leaders of governments around the world, including in the nuclear weapon states, have reaffirmed the commitment to pursue a world free of nuclear weapons. A stance they have taken in the unilateral statements and bilateral joint statements, and most recently, a stance reflected in Resolution 1887, which was adopted at the historic summit last September, in the Security Council. The next steps for nuclear disarmaments are very clear. They will involve additional cuts in the largest nuclear arsenals,

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helped by the Russian Federation and the United States, pursuing negotiations on a Treaty to replace the START treaty, which expires later this year.

Other nuclear weapon states have their own constructive roles to play by limiting their own capabilities and eventually joining disarmament negotiations, as regard in the article 6. They can also accelerate procedures for ratification of the signature of CTBT, and for the start of substantive negotiations in the CD in Geneva. In terms of confidence building, and in addition to the need of enhanced transparency, I think it would be enormously important for the nuclear weapon states to establish some domestic organizations, legislation, regulations, and budgetary allocations, devoted specifically to the achievement of disarmament goals.

When adopting Resolution 1540, the Security Council required all states to have domestic laws and regulations against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and all the weapons of mass destruction, or their acquisition by non state actors. It hardly seems unreasonable to expect that the similar commitment will be taken and reflected in domestic laws and institutions in the nuclear weapon states.

It would also be useful if the nuclear weapon states will refrain from insisting that nuclear arsenals are indispensable to their security, since the same argument can be used to justify proliferation. The improvement of negative security assurances as stated by the nuclear weapon states would also be welcomed in that context. For their part, the non nuclear weapon states also have to do more to support the Treaty. Many of such states have not yet concluded NPT safeguards agreements with the IAEA, reporting under the Treaty is still incomplete.

A strong case has been made that the Additional Protocol should become the global safeguards norm, though the likelihood of this occurrence will depend significantly upon real signs of progress, both in disarmament, and in recognizing the inalienable right for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Also, while nuclear weapon states have raised concerns of a compliance with the disarmament parties of the Treaty, they should also work individually and collectively to solve proliferation concerns among other states parties. Proliferation should be opposed, not simply because of where it may occur, but because it is fundamentally inconsistent with the aim of eliminating nuclear weapons everywhere.

The greatest task I have for the state parties would be to restore and strengthening a universal perception of balance among the key objectives of the Treaty. Transparency and accountability will be inevitably crucial in achieving this goal, by building confidence that all state parties are fully living up to their commitments.

With this balance restored, and assisted by transparency and accountability will come an important additionally benefit, namely a strengthening of the credibility of the Treaty, in terms both of their effectiveness and its basic fairness and legitimacy. The real litmus test for accountability and transparency will come in May 2010, at the next NPT Review Conference. It will be a test to see how well the whole review process is working. This event will offer an excellent opportunity for both, nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty, to document what they have done to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty and to consider what additional steps will be needed to achieve these three great goals.

I will conclude these remarks on a note of cautious optimism: support for disarmament is unquestionable growing, worldwide, along with the widespread opposition to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Right now we are witnessing an almost ideal configuration of factors pointing to progress in the years ahead. The future of this Treaty will be bright indeed, if it is guided by enlightened leadership from the nuclear weapon states, a growing support from the general public, and persistent efforts, especially by the non nuclear states, in the international diplomatic community. Just as the NPT has three essential pillars, I

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will view these additional factors: leadership, persistence, and support from the civil society, as constituting the three political pillars of the Treaty. With the balance and credibility fully restored, the NPT can better serve international peace and security. Let us all resolve to support this goal. Thank you very much.

Applause



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