



No-proliferación para la Seguridad Global
Nonproliferation for Global Security

International Seminar

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament - The Future of the NPT

Rio de Janeiro, October 29 and 30, 2009

Full audio transcription *

Quotes in Spanish, Portuguese, and German translated into English

Panel 1: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime Facing the 2010 NPT Review October 29, 2009

Irma Arguello: -I call to the table, please, to Joe Cirincione, Rebecca Johnson and Ambassador Rolf Ekéus. I would also want to call Ambassador Sergio González Gálvez. Well, we are all ready to start the First panel, as I said before we decided to name it “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime facing the 2010 NPT Review”.

This panel is especially important because the colleagues who stand beside me will try to present a brief and clear diagnose regarding the current situation of the nonproliferation regime. In this sense, a lot has been debated about the current crisis in the nonproliferation regime and this panel will try to provide with the conceptual bases that will later on serve to develop different topics in the rest of the panels. Now, I will have the pleasure to introduce my fellow colleagues in the panel.

First and foremost, I introduce Rebecca Johnson, executive director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy in London and editor of Disarmament Diplomacy, an international magazine about global security and multilateral negotiations over weapons. She holds a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics and writes extensively on the UN system and multilateral treaties, notably the NPT and the CTBT, as well as other disarmament and nonproliferation negotiations, civil society, British defense policy, space weaponization and international security, topics in which her authoritative opinion is consulted by media worldwide. She has served as a consultant to the EU and provided evidence to British, German and EU parliamentary committees. Her recent book on the CTBT, titled *Unfinished Business* was published by the UN in 2009.

Following, I introduce Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, standing beside me on my right, he has been the Chairman of the SIPRI Governing Board since 2002. He was a member of the Advisory Board on Disarmament of the Secretary General of the UN from 1998 to 2003, High Commissioner on National Minorities appointed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) from 2001 to 2007, as well as on the Board of Directors of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Since 2005, he has been a Commissioner of the International Commission on Missing Persons. He is also member of the Supervisory Council of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe. From 1991 to 1997, he led the UN Special Commission on Iraq.

On my left, Ambassador Sergio González Gálvez who is Doctor Honoris Causa from the Autonomous University of Nuevo León, lawyer, served for 42 years as a career diplomat, Ambassador Emeritus of the Mexican Foreign Service, Deputy Secretary of Foreign Relations for two administrations, Mexican Ambassador to Japan, and Law Consultant for the Mexican Foreign Office. He served as Mexican Delegate for the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, Mexican Ambassador to Brazil, Mexican Representative in 25 UN General Assemblies, participant in the negotiation and approval of the Tlatelolco Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Published author, he is currently an advisor for the National Secretary of Defense.

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And finally, let me introduce Joseph Cirincione, who joined the Ploughshares Fund as its President in 2008. He served previously as Senior Vice president for National Security and International policy at the Center for American Progress and as director for nonproliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He worked for the U.S. House of Representatives as a professional staff member of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Government Operations, and served as staff director of the bipartisan Military Reform Caucus. Today, Joe is an expert advisor to the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. He also serves as a member of the Advisory Committee to the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism.

As you can see, it is a luxury panel. I now give the floor to our first speaker, Rebecca Johnson, for you. Thank you.

Rebecca Johnson: -Thank you very much, Irma. And I'd like to begin, actually, by giving my very grateful thanks to CEBRI and the NPSGlobal Foundation not only for convening, I think, this very important and timely seminar here, but especially for bring me to this very beautiful city of Rio de Janeiro, which I've always wanted to visit and I never had the opportunity before.

Now, as the opening speaker on this session, I want to start by just going through some, perhaps, of the very familiar elements of the NPT and the challenges that we face running up to 2010. But I'll move through these very quickly. This is the state of the Treaty in 2009 and by any calculation to have 189 states parties, the vast majority of which are in full compliance, is a real triumph. This is a good Treaty, a strong Treaty in many ways but it does have some weaknesses. One of the weaknesses is that the nuclear weapon states continue to claim that nuclear weapons are indispensable for their security. Although we do see some signs of change, especially with President Obama and in the UK there is a rather odd decision that it's both to replace the Trident nuclear weapon system and to work for nuclear disarmament. And, of course, together the civil society in the UK is actually trying to move the equation more towards working for nuclear disarmament by devaluing nuclear weapons, which means the UK recognizing it does not need to replace the Trident. But we still have some way to go on that. And of course there are three significant nuclear possessors outside the Treaty and a certain amount of hedging bets in the regime.

Now, here are the familiar NPT challenges. Of course, we have to resolve the current proliferation concerns, but we have to prevent new ones arising. There are concerns about non compliance and bad faith and I deliberately put this as having, actually, two kinds of direction, two levels. There is the kind of non compliance that you saw with North Korea over many years prior to its announcement of withdrawal that we also saw with other countries like Iraq, questions around Syria, Libya, others and of course Iran still and ongoing challenge on that level. But also real concerns about what many non nuclear weapons states do call non compliance and at the very least is called bad faith, which is a legal term and is specifically identified in article 6 of the Treaty that there should be negotiations in good faith on cessation on the arms' race and nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. So that's both sides of this non compliance and bad faith equation.

Then there are the specifics, the CTBT has not yet entered into force, still nine countries, essential for entering into force have not ratified and three of those have not yet signed. The Conference on Disarmament is still dead locked after eleven years, actually is longer than that in reality because it really is from the end of the CTBT in 1996, dead locked so no Fissile Material Treaty. And then there's a challenge to identifying the steps. I'm actually gonna argue that we know what the next steps are. The 13 steps agreed by the NPT states parties in 2000 basically identify the principles, the objectives, the steps, the measures that should be taken unilaterally, bilaterally, plurilaterally among the five and multilaterally involving everybody.

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The issue is not really what are the next steps, it's which to prioritize, how they fit in with each other and how to make them happen, in other words how to implement. Then there is the group of challenges around the nuclear fuel cycle, around the production of plutonium, the separation through reprocessing, both for civilian and military purposes, the highly enriched uranium, the way in which some countries had uranium enrichment for civilian purposes but as we know with the challenges over Iran these could very easily, in technological terms, provide the material, the raw material to make nuclear weapons.

There is concern about terrorism when these highly radioactive substances, either nuclear weapon capable or dirty bomb capable materials, are sloshing around the world in various different kinds of ways being transported by rail, by air, by road, by sea causing a potential terrorist risk.

The problem of universality, and again this goes back to essentially to the trio, if you count North Korea, four states outside which are also part of very key challenging regions and I think universality is particularly important for the countries of the Middle East with regards of Israel. And the nuclear weapons free zones as we have seen here in Latin America and the Caribbean enabled countries such as Argentina and Brazil, which had their own nuclear program race if you like at a period of history, gain confidence to be able to become part of regional confidence building nuclear weapon free zones and through that get rid of those nuclear weapon programs and also, of course, join the NPT.

And the last I think is very important and I'm going to talk more about this, if the NPT is challenged by not having effective decision making and institutional powers to address the real world challenges that affect nuclear weapons. Now, also part of our political context, because these challenges are both political and institutional, nuclear weapons might be now of demising significance for some of the nuclear weapon states but we have to recognize they are still regarded as attractive, they are still regarded as instruments of political policy and also security. And different countries for different reasons still seem to think that nuclear weapons can bring on the one hand strategic stability.

Russia is the one in particular that pushes for this, but I think China and also the US see nuclear weapons as having some kind a role here. A seat at the top table increasingly ends up for France and the UK that's really what nuclear weapons provide because we are part of the European Union we don't have direct security threats that our nuclear weapons would have any relevance whatsoever in providing, but we are worried that if we gave them up we wouldn't be taken as seriously, not only in relation to the Security Council, which is a different set of issues, but generally. And this, of course, leads to the third, which is the increase bargaining power and higher leverage that countries such as India certainly feels that it has gained through coming public as a "de facto" nuclear weapon state. Power projection, particularly regional, in my view this is much more at the heart of what Iran is doing. And then of course a form of deterrence that shows that weak, despotic and failing leaders within the region using the NPT regime in a sense and using the possibility of a threat to use nuclear weapons in order to hold off other countries that might be seeking to engage on behalf of the human rights of people.

We also have challenges I call the nuclear insurance strategies, this may be controversial having included Japan and Brazil in these sophisticated levels of nuclear technology that if the political situation were to change, if decision making were to be taken, could be relatively quickly translated into a nuclear weapon capability. Nobody is saying that's what they are for but there is an option there. It's an insurance strategy. That may be what Iran seeks. Then the nuclear umbrella, there are a lot of questions for NATO, for Japan and its new government, for Australia and also, of course, for the United States as the nuclear guarantor currently of extended deterrence.

Article 4, nuclear energy promotion, but it also hedges security and in some cases economic. I'm not gonna duel on that in this panel because you have others, but I raise some questions about that and questions about where these all leads, the genuinely non nuclear states that want nuclear abolition. How

do real world security challenges differ from the NPT concerns? We are going into 2010. There are issues that this conference has to address that have to do with the real world but we also can't overload what is essentially a Treaty Review Conference.

I ask some questions. Does the NPT stand proliferation? Yes, for now. Will it block further proliferation? I really have my doubts on this. We need to marginalize and devalue nuclear weapons. Not just bring the numbers down, but bring the value and the doctrines into line with nuclear disarmament to serve security and regional (...). Will the NPT facilitate disarmament? I think really probably not. I think there are real questions about that and we need to look at those more carefully. I also argue that although I don't think the NPT is part of the problem yet, it is a flawed regime. It is of declining usefulness. We need it because we haven't got anything better but for security we need something better. Can it be repaired? And I'm going to argue that it needs to be transformed to be a nuclear security and disarmament regime rather than what it was in the 1960s which was in many ways a nuclear technology trade off.

So looking to 2010, these are some of the considerations. We have to look at the diplomacy, the politics, the perceived, the objectives, the interests, the motivations, the structure, and the procedures. Other relevant factors are gonna be regional dynamics, particularly in the Middle East, but also Northeast Asia I think is going to be significant. And here, let me say that I think regional dynamics in regions that have very strong nuclear weapons free zones entered into force, not only Latin America and the Caribbean but also Africa, and the Pacific. These can play a positive in a sense collective role to facilitate success in 2010. And then some of these other issues that really are all about diplomacy and I'm not gonna dwell on them for too long. Specific considerations on the run up to 2010. We all have to recognize the Obama administration. President Obama has changed the political context in which we look at this. We mustn't exaggerate how much he can do. He is one man, head of a very difficult administration and a country with many, many other kinds of problems. But he said he's led out the store from Prague to the Security Council summit in on September 24th at the UN Security Council and also that he wants a nuclear security summit in, I think now it's gonna be early April of 2010. But how do we move from that vision that he's laid out to policy? Including the Nuclear Posture Review, it's going to be critical, START-plus ratification, START-plus itself is gonna be critical, and then the ratification, CTBT ratification and also I think the NATO's Nuclear Posture Review. US - Russia relations seem to be improved, but of course these are of major consideration. The value still, according to nuclear weapons, I still put this in because I think is critical. I think it's diminishing but don't think it's gone far enough yet.

So, how do we balance off the concrete steps we need with the commitments to wolf nuclear weapons? Iran's nuclear program again, others are gonna talk more about that, but this is clearly a major consideration, and the dynamics in the Middle East. Related concerns, Six part Talks in North Korea, back to the NPT. Can we bring North Korea back to the NPT? I've just come back from Japan and the current government there, the new government, is actually rather interested in trying to, perhaps, initiate talks now with South Korea to bring in North Korea into a nuclear weapon free zone in Northeast Asia. Now, that's not gonna happen overnight. There are many obstacles to overcome. But it is interesting that they are thinking about this because it could be a mechanism to bring security assurances from all the nuclear weapon states for the region: China, Russia, The United States, and to build confidence. There's the legacy of the US-India deal, which I think is rather negative legacy, it has undermined some of the tools and instruments that we rely on for nuclear non proliferation and nuclear control and then the question about nuclear energy and whether it can be made proliferation safe.

So can the NPT deliver nuclear security and can it stand proliferation? I have to stress the NPT is a means to an end, it is a tool. What is our real objective? And in my view our real objective is security. And it's security without nuclear weapons, whether that is bringing them to very low levels, whether that is going to virtual deterrence, whether that is going to complete abolition. And these all take time. So if

these means are out dated, or are inadequate, or they get in the way, can they be improved? Or should they be transformed? And then these other questions.

I argue that for 2010 we need to adopt better tools. We need to separate the debate and adoption of forward looking decisions and commitments from the review of the Treaty which looks backwards and says all the problems that there've been. Will governments rise to the challenge? I hope so, but on past evidence I don't hold out many hopes.

So I come to my conclusions here about the implications of success or failure, and I have four. I think that NPT parties need to have more powers and responsibilities to pursue implementation of their own decisions. So whether annual meetings, or a secretariat or both, the institutions have got to be strengthened, there's got to be more confidence that the NPT states can actually implement their own decisions. We know what is on the to-do list for the practical actions. We actually need the tools for to pursue them and implement them.

Secondly, the relation with the CTBT to the NPT remains absolutely critical, but US ratification, while we need to keep up the pressure for it, it must not be made a condition, because the worst possible thing would be for the US to be bounced to try ratify and not to have the numbers. So we need to keep up the pressure but it should not be a condition of success or failure. In fact, the other possibility is to have a good strong successful NPT conference. It could give more muscle to the Obama administration in dealing with the republicans and convincing them to ratify the CTBT, and also the future START.

Third, a successful NPT, this is my point, my third point is a successful NPT would give a boost to president Obama and other leaders now pushing for a world free of nuclear weapons, but, that does not mean compromising at the lowest common denominator. Pressure must be sustained for more compliance, progress, and implementation.

My final point is, if you want a world without nuclear weapons, then you need to think about the treaty or treaties that will co-define the obligations, prohibitions, procedures and requirements. It is not premature to consider and put on your government's agenda and in your government statements and papers the call for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Calling for a Nuclear Weapons Convention will not undermine the NPT anymore than calling for CTBT undermined the Partial Test Ban Treaty or the NPT. On the contrary, it would provide a mechanism and a process to fulfill the NPT, to strengthen it and fulfill it, notably articles 1, 2 and 6. Thank you very much.

Irma Arguello: -Thank you very much, Rebecca. It has been an excellent overview of the current and future situation of the Treaty looking at the next year. Now the word goes to Ambassador Rolf Ekéus. Rolf, please.

Rolf Ekéus: -Irma, thank you very much for inviting me here and I think it's a wonderful initiative by CEBRI and NPS to gather here, to really focus on this important issue, non proliferation. It's also fantastic for me to speak after Rebecca because she has covered so much ground for me, so I can make my, I hope, I will still have my 15 minutes.

But, anyhow, the 2005 NPT Review Conference did not deliver any tangible results, more than maybe some depressing memories of the participants. Now when facing the 2010 Review the first question must be if we can register any positive developments since 2005, or if we see any significant development. Well, I think we have to be modest with the positive, but significant that there has been in some events.

One can say that most events unfortunately have had the character of challenges against, or of challenges towards the regime. Little or nothing, we have to first note, has happen, some of us, in the most important area of the Treaty of reduction of nuclear weapons, reduction of the Treaty of arsenals on the two main nuclear weapon states. They have been ok, there has been ballistic missile defense system developed in Mid Europe, and it has come, and it has gone.

Out of the five NPT non nuclear weapon states, I think, only China has increased its nuclear arsenal. That it is, of course, not good, as we would like all of them to diminish their arsenals. With one exception, the international moratorium on nuclear weapon testing has been observed. Well, in three regions, East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East we have seen real disturbing developments, and this is a reason for deep deep concern. In this testing is obvious we think about DPRK, North Korea, which had exploded some sort, at least, of nuclear device. But that, anyhow, being an exception, so the moratorium has been holding.

The security ratifications has been considered, however, into strong international engagement, fortunately, by major actors in the Asian region. So that has been good damage-limitation operations, but the complexity is still such that we don't know where to go. The South Asian situation, of course, has deteriorated dramatically. As a consequence of the spill over effect of the Afghanistan conflict into Pakistan. Proliferation risks appear now unavoidable, also taking in account the presence of terrorist networks. Imagine that all of us are seriously disturbed, I'm sorry to talk of that. It's also disturbing the size and the extension of Pakistan's arsenals and nuclear missiles, there is a big size of Pakistan's missiles that we have registered in secret. Likewise, we have registered that Indian nuclear weapons programs has boosted by the unfortunate US-India deal on nuclear cooperation. India's number of weapons is expanding rapidly. In that context the quick surrender of the Nuclear Suppliers Group under pressure from the Bush administration in accepting the US-India deal has seriously put into question the credibility of the Nuclear Supplier Group as the future bulldog against proliferation. I think that is a serious damage. How can we trust Nuclear Supplier Group after this? The growing complexity of interethnic and interreligious relations is seriously affecting the security in the South Asian region and the relations between the nuclear weapon states are, of course, affected.

So there, we are moving in extremely sensitive territory. To that comes that Iran also is touched by the deteriorating situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The intensification of Iran's nuclear activities and the contradictory signal out of Iran about its intentions, creates confusion and security concerns especially in the Middle East, all of this affected by the enigmatic character of Israel's clandestine nuclear activities.

So, the regional situation from the disarmament and non proliferation point of view since 2005, has been going from bad to poorly. Well, it has been looked upon in the US, the START process with considerable reductions on the arsenals of the two major powers, we are satisfied with that. France and the United Kingdom have seen some limitations, we heard from Rebecca also, in their nuclear weapons program. But China has continued to add to its arsenal. And as I said so has India and Pakistan. So in the balance three states are growing rapidly in nuclear capability.

As a consequence of the findings by the International Commission of Climate Change and the growing awareness about the possibility of global warming, the interest in electricity generated by nuclear power, because the experience is what you would call renaissance. This nuclear renaissance has the potential to spread nuclear technology around and the uneasy relationship between nuclear energy for civilian and military purposes has increased the potential for weapons proliferation. One remedy which has been proposed earlier by the Bush administration and the Director General of the IAEA is multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle. I know that that is of great interest for Brazil and Argentina, among others. In effect, this would imply that the production of fuel for civil reactors should be limited to those providers already in existence, and that new national production should be discouraged.

Delivering security should be assured through an international mechanism linked to the IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency with a Nuclear Fuel Bank as proposed and financed by the NTI, the Nuclear Threat Initiative. That could serve as a supplier of last resort. Given the character of the world market of nuclear fuel, with tendency to oversupply and price pressures, this makes perfect economic sense. But what makes it less attractive in the eyes of some, and I have respect for that, is that such a multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle would create a new division of haves and have-nots as regards an important part of nuclear technology. I just remind you because it was so well addressed by Rebecca that the matter of loose nukes and nuclear material are not in full control, it has to be addressed.

And I think that there we have seen considerable progress since 2005 with the implementation of Nunn-Lugar initiatives and the covert threat reduction activities. So I think that we should congratulate those who've been driving this. But, since 2005 the record of nuclear disarmament is poor, the pressure for proliferation is strong and growing, and little has happen that could reject the charge that the non proliferation regime is fundamentally and expression of double standards. So that, I am sounding much more sadder than Rebecca. But still I think there is a growing sense that everything is not lost and that there are prospects for a positive outcome of the NPT Review Conference. And I have to confess the reason is the change in the United States and the arrival of the administration of President Barack Obama.

In Prague in April he spoke of international peace and security in a world free of nuclear weapons. That was a statement by the leader of one of the two largest nuclear arsenals. And in September, President Obama led the UN Security Council Summit in adopting the Resolution 1887, though not concrete in substance, so full, so full of promise. It is clear that President Obama, already during his election campaign picked up the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons from former American statemen Shultz, Kissinger, Nunn, Perry, all former practitioners and theorists in doctrines of deterrence, and in the use of nuclear weapons. Now Obama has injected the vision with the power of the Presidency. His own proposals have been so far up pretty packed of revolutionary character, and his rethoric has made it all feasible and rational, to seriously look upon steps to be taken to realize the vision.

The START I think has already been mentioned and then we hope it will be successfully developed during the end of this year. The matter is, of course, the ratification by the US Senate and the ratification by the US Senate regarding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the CTBT, before the start of the Review Conference in early May. If that would happen that would give the Conference and the nonproliferation regime a tremendous boost. In such an event, several of the remaining non-ratifiers would be expected to follow the American lead. China and Indonesia have clearly indicated that they would seriously ratify the CTBT and it would be politically difficult and a credibility challenge for India to hold out of to the astonishingly complacent treatment the Nuclear Supplier Group granted it in the conection to with its deal with the United States on the nuclear issue.

It must be said it will not be easy for President Obama to gain the necessary 2/3 majority of the Senate. As Senator Nunn has pointed out, ratification will require compromises and that is the problem. What compromises? Compromises on the issue on refurbishing the US nuclear weapons complex. A reflect upon that. A ratification should not be allowed to be gained in a way, by that I quote Senator Nunn, to be gained in a way which would undermine the spirit and purpose of the CTBT and the long term vision of a nuclear weapon free world.

The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has of course now the challenge of moving on the matter of a treaty halting the production of fissile material. And it is unacceptable that one delegation, I think it is the Pakistan delegation in the CD, is bloking the launching of the multilateral negotiations. Also maybe some other delegations like Iran and some others may be quietly satisfied, hiding behind this obstruction.

But, if we get such a treaty early, that would otherwise be the first step towards the future convention banning nuclear weapons. And that's why it has such tremendous significance. A multilateral treaty, now, at last in the nuclear field. The two major challenges of doctrinal and principal significance are awaiting the American administration. Before the end of the year the administration has to decide upon the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States. It is already known that deep divisions exist within the group responsible for preparing the new Nuclear Posture. No doubt it will be a test of President Obama's vision.

Also come the other tests, namely the decision on the nuclear doctrine within the NATO strategy concept. This necessitates the dialogue between the new administration and its allies, some of whom are increasingly skeptical about the need for sub-strategy nuclear weapons being stationed in Europe. The question is if NATO still intend to rely on nuclear weapons, how can NATO states persuade others to give up their nuclear weapons, and set aside possible nuclear weapons divisions? So there is no doubt that even this time the question of regional security and the role of nuclear weapons in the Middle East can become the make or break issue at the Review Conference. And that I have to think.

The Israeli nuclear capability remains a constant reminder of the sensitivity to other states in the region. But I have already indicated the Iranian enigmatic nuclear ambitions as a manifest during the last few years, have made the Middle East question even more sensitive as the tensions between Iran and the moderate Arab states in the area emerges as a major potential for violent conflict. And the Middle East will now, even more than in 2005, when it contributed to wreck the whole Conference, threaten a successful outcome of 2010.

Therefore, full attention must be given to this situation which is potentially destructive to the non proliferation regime. Serious reflection must be devoted and the question is how to launch a diplomatic and political process to reach an agreement on free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East should be addressed. And all ideas considered, including the Egyptian proposal on appointing an independent special envoy for the realization of the zone project should be taken into consideration at the Review Conference.

So, just one word in conclusion. I think at the Review Conference in May all good forces should cooperate to achieve a successful outcome of that Conference. That means that most important would be the engagement by the non nuclear weapon states and this event here shows that Latin America gives a signal to the international community and we hope that Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico are ready to step forward, to take the lead. They should not wait, they should take the lead. In 2000, New Agenda Coalition demonstrated with Brazil as a leading partner with a number of non-aligned states, both in South and North, the Coalition had the right combination of competence and political skills, and it made a difference. And such an arrangement will, maybe, make a difference. The success of New Agenda Coalition should inspire responsible actors among the non nuclear states to step forward for a leadership role, not wait upon the big guys. That is what should happen, take a leadership role for success, for the nonproliferation would then be. Thank you very much.

Irma Arguello: -Thank you very much, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus. After our last presentation, which will be Joseph Cirincione's one, we are going to have the opportunity to ask questions to the panelists. Now I would like to turn the table to Ambassador Sergio González Gálvez. Thank you Ambassador.

Sergio González Gálvez: -Distinguished members of this table, distinguished auditorium. In this timely seminar sponsored by the NPSGlobal Foundation and the Brazilian Center for International Relations, I would like to focus the attention for a couple of minutes on the problems that we currently see on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons system, based fundamentally, though not only on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, and the treaties that establish nuclear free zones around the

world. And analyze very briefly, the future situation of this phenomenon, looking toward the future Review Conference of the named international instrument, putting the light –amongst others – on the following considerations:

I should clarify that this intervention is made on a personal title, and not on behalf of the Ministry of Defense, as it is said on the agenda, although after a life in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, today I am a Consultant of the Secretary of National Defense of Mexico.

One of the doubts, one of the elements I would like to share with you, is to see how the key elements of the Nonproliferation Treaty have been applied after 39 years since its entry into force. And the measures that, in our opinion, should be analyzed to strengthen the impact of the document in the situation we live in. At the same time, we would like to give an interpretation of the difficulties faced by the last meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the NPT, carried out in May of this year, in order to agree by consensus –an effort on which they failed- a modest project of the recommendation to be considered during the Conference.

As introduction, I would like to remind the distinguished audience some of the doubts that have overwhelmed the international community as a whole, since the beginning of the negotiations to approve a Nonproliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons, and that continue to be, to a certain point of concern today. And regarding this topic, I must recall that several years ago, Mexico considered and publicly declared its intentions to withdraw from the NPT facing the impasse and systematic deadlock of the multilateral forums on disarmament issues, not to negotiate background issues, which would be understandable on an international negotiation, but to start speaking about previously scheduled topics. This situation was seriously altering the commitments between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states inside the Treaty, a topic that I will address later on.

Among the problems that came during the negotiation of the NPT, we find the problem of control or surveillance of the acquired obligations that was obviously solved by including a uniform safeguards regime in charge of the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose headquarters are in Vienna. Even when we had to find a solution to the situation stated by several European countries that were inclined to give EURATOM, meaning a regional organization, that responsibility, a topic that has been present in one way or the other, in the negotiations to establish the full validity of the Tlatelolco Treaty, for the proscription of nuclear weapons in Latin America, and that was fortunately solved – I think- in good faith consultations between member states of the regional instrument.

But without a doubt, distinguished auditorium, the most severe and founded critic that has been done to the NPT is, maybe, to sustain that is unequal and discriminatory. Without a doubt, the Treaty achieved the immediate freezing of a status quo that favors some over others. The monopoly of nuclear weapons by certain countries is perpetuated and institutionalized by means of the Treaty.

But the problem is to know if there was any other alternative or if this was an inevitable situation. We must recognize this: no nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty will ever satisfy everyone. The very nature of the treaty and its fundamentally negative character, of prohibition, originates an unbalanced situation between the obligations and rights it establishes. Seeing the inequity of situations and other unavoidable realities of the contemporary world, any treaty of that kind should have to affect some countries more than others and demand more from some than from others. Therefore, it cannot help but contain some elements of inequity and discrimination.

But if that is undeniable, the fact that unless there's a radical change in the international circumstances should be undeniable and to a greater extent, either we keep and strengthen the NPT, with all its limitations and unavoidable defects, or we step away forever from the possibility of stopping an arms

career and move towards general and complete disarmament. And about this we should emphasize that the NPT is not anything but a step in the long path towards disarmament, but it's a mandatory step that we cannot avoid. Therefore we cannot judge the NPT just by its intrinsic merits, but we should take into consideration all the options that remain open.

The alternative of a world without restrictions, where nuclear weapons and nuclear states proliferate, shows itself as the safest way to endanger peace and to not reach the goals pursued by the non-nuclear-weapon states. That is, nuclear disarmament as a part of complete and full disarmament. It is true that the NPT tends more to stop the multiplication of the future risks of nuclear war than to eliminate the ones that already exist. But that objective, though limited is important and worthy.

Nonproliferation itself is a vital need, even if it wasn't accompanied by any complement. As it was said in its time by the representative of Mexico in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and I quote "The obligations that the non-nuclear-weapon states will assume in a nonproliferation treaty are obligations that have in themselves their own justification, that being, they are indispensable and valuable and not only as compensatory and reciprocal as those assumed by the nuclear weapon states."

Recognizing those facts and remembering their origins, is not incompatible with the principle of acceptable equilibrium that must exist between the responsibilities and the mutual obligations among nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. There is an unavoidable, logical and legitimate bond between nonproliferation and the imperative need to start the nuclear disarmament of the great powers. One of the toughest problems the current world needs to solve lies, in our opinion, in the need to conciliate and link those objectives in a viable and fair formulation.

Even if it's not possible to subordinate horizontal nonproliferation to vertical nonproliferation, or in other terms, you cannot put as a condition for an agreement to stop the existence of a larger number of states and nuclear weapons, to a previous or simultaneous agreement to diminish or limit the nuclear arsenals of atomic powers. However, a treaty that leads to perpetuate the division of the world in nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states will never be efficient, and even if it's formally declared of indefinite validity, that permanence cannot last very long if the compliance of all its dispositions is not sought.

On the other hand, we have analyzed with particular interest the debates of the last meeting of the Preparatory Committee, in charge of the NPT, celebrated last May. And in particular, we did it with the working document, with some recommendations for the Conference, which was not approved, despite of the weakness of its terms. And we see with concern, distinguished auditorium, the main objections to the inclusion of specific measures for disarmament, following what is called for on article 6 of the Treaty.

Which on the other hand does not mean an objection to the proposals, but to the forum on which they were negotiated, and the reserves to the possible identification of proposals to establish a legal frame to advance in nuclear disarmament, taking as a reference point specific topics discussed and approved in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, and as it is remembered in the preamble of the Resolution 1887 of the UN Security Council.

The previous considerations lead us to reflect on the path that we must follow, taking into consideration that the NPT is a necessary step, but only a step, in the quest for nuclear disarmament as a process, I quote "towards a general and complete disarmament under an international and effective control, starting by the nuclear", end of quote.

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But it is also worrying that the number of nuclear-weapon-states has increased year after year, and that even if we are living a moratorium of nuclear testing (in spite of the fact that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has not entered into force), and that we haven't found any formula to control the nuclear testing with the use of computers. We should keep persisting in strengthening the NPT and maybe to revive ideas, as those that were stated in the past to elaborate protocols for the NPT, one to give continuity to the compromise established in the article 6 of the Treaty, committing ourselves to carry out good faith negotiations, with specific measures to stop the nuclear arms career, such as the 13 steps that were approved by the 2000 Review Conference, even though I think they should be drastically updated because of the recent developments. And another protocol to provide a proper legal framework for the safety guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons upon non-nuclear-weapon states, part of the NPT.

By the way, the reiterated mentions that the recommendations of the 2000 Review Conference should be taken into consideration should make us reflect on topics like the convenience of unanimously reiterating to the governments of India, Pakistan and Israel that they should enter the NPT as soon as possible, without conditions and negotiate the necessary safeguards agreements, independently of the continuance of the negotiations with the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, so they will return to the NPT and keep their support to the 1992 declaration, committing themselves to create a zone, not only free of nuclear weapons, but also free of weapons of mass destruction of any sort, and with Iran so they will cooperate with the IAEA in the supervision of their nuclear facilities, following the Security Council resolutions on the matter. We also have a need to convince the states parties of nuclear free zones to subscribe to the IAEA's Additional Protocol on Safeguards that provides more certainty to the objective of these treaties.

About the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East, we should remember that Mexico offered Israel several years ago the legal formula that was incorporated to the Tlatelolco Treaty in its article 28, paragraph 2, where the faculties to dispense the requirements for the entry into force are stated. Tel Aviv told us that they would accept this concept if all the countries in the zone were to do the same thing. Besides, it is indispensable, as it's stated in the Blix report, to reject thesis that support preemptive strikes in any circumstance. This action is particularly worrying when it's done by nuclear weapon states, and affects the reach of the right to legitimate defense according to article 51 of the UN Charter.

Last, a topic on which it's worth to think in the medium and long terms is the possible bond between the creation of nuclear free zones and the efforts to self-control conventional weapons within those zones. As it was mentioned in 1978 by the distinguished French author J. F. Guihaudis -in his piece "Les zones exemptes"-, on which he pointed out, speaking mainly about Europe, that it would be preferable not to consider nuclear weapons as something separated from conventional weapons, because de-nuclearization cannot work when it's not balanced with the conventional forces in one region. Besides, we cannot forget that since the tenth extraordinary period of sessions of the UN's General Assembly celebrated in 1978, in which for the first time since the postwar period the organized community carried out an evaluation of the objectives on the subject of disarmament, which is included by consensus in the document that holds the results of the investigation. On the following passage it says "amongst the negotiations on nuclear disarmament, there should be a limitation and gradual reduction of conventional weapons following the framework of the advances towards a general and complete disarmament, always taking into consideration the needs of the states to protect their own safety and their right to legitimate defense established in the UN Charter".

In Latin America, Mexico and other countries have carried out several efforts in this sense. The last was initiated in the meeting of the Rio Group, in Cochabamba on September 1996, and recently the president of Mexico, Felipe Calderón referred to this phenomenon in the Security Council's meeting for Heads of State and Heads of Government.

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Without any doubt, distinguished auditorium, the Tlatelolco Treaty has faced several financing problems, as did all international organizations in existence, as well, as ambiguous interpretations of its text by states that have signed the Second Protocol, open to nuclear powers. We have suffered the impact of the exclusion among the prohibitions of the Treaty, of the transit by request – I must say- of the United States, but Mexico and Panama, Panama due to the importance of the canal, has rightfully refused in exercise of its right as member state of that absence. And the range that has been questioned of the application zone of the Treaty in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, that some have wrongfully interpreted as in violation of the Conventions on the Law of the Sea and the impossibility – that we hope is temporal- to reach a OPANAL's policy on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, allowing me very to suggest very respectfully a collaboration between ABACC and OPANAL to take this matter. However we should point out that this collective effort is still in force, under the light of legal commitments of Latin America and the Caribbean on this important matter.

Finally, Madam President, these are the observations I should make on the topic of our Seminar, we are not of those who regret having approved the indefinite extension of the Treaty, but we do think that it should be strengthened and that we should convince our allied countries that are not yet part of the Treaty to change their attitude, specially those who already possess nuclear weapons and we should impulse the creation of other nuclear free zones in the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula because of their conflictive character. But also, and I emphasize this, we should make our position very clear against any kind of armed action outside of those established by the UN Charter in its chapter 7 and only when determined by the Security Council or the General Assembly, against countries with whom nuclear control agreements are being negotiated. Thank you very much for your attention.

Irma Arguello: -Thank you very much Ambassador González Gálvez. I would like to turn the table to Joe Cirincione, the last speaker of this session.

Joseph Cirincione: -Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here. I want to thank the organizers of the... that's not the way it's supposed to look, let me see if I can fix that, let's just mirror it. ...That's better. Thank you. Let me thank the organizers of this conference for inviting me here today. Let me specially thank the government of the United States for their support for this conference in particular, my ticket for coming here.

As the American on this panel want to concentrate on American nuclear policy so you can better understand what is happening in the Unites States and how your actions can help or hurt what the ongoing transformation of US nuclear policy.

For those of you who have been working in this field for many, many years I thank you for your dedicated service. For those of you who are new to this field, I congratulate you on your timing because this is a new moment in nuclear policy. We have never seen anything like it. It's the result of four interacting trends, the increase in the threats, the collapse of the previous non proliferation policy, the development of a new strategic paradigm, and the simultaneous emergence of new leaderships at the heads of most major powers in the world.

It's not uncommon to see a United States' president or a Brazilian president change. It's very rare to see most of the countries in the world, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, or Australia, Brazil develop new leadership at nearly the same time, meaning leadership less weight to the failed policies of the past, more willing to embrace new and more effective strategies. I want to go through this new moment, step by step so we understand what we have.

The threats we face are fourfold, more seriously the threat of nuclear terrorism. That Al Qaeda or a similar messianic apocalyptic group could get a weapon or the material to produce a weapon and use it.

It's not necessary that it be used in the United States, any major city, Rio, Buenos Aires, for example, would be a level of destruction the world has never seen, would have international economic and political ramifications. You can take the rights that you enjoy in this country and put them on the shelf, you might never see them again. There would be draconian measures put in place in most countries around the world to prevent a second devastating nuclear attack.

The second threat we face is the threat of the 23.000 existing nuclear weapons in the world. In just recent years, we've had major accidents with our nuclear bombs in the United States, flying with nuclear weapons nobody knew where on. Last year a British and a French nuclear armed submarines collided in the middle of the second largest ocean in the world. Is it unrealistic to expect that we will have an accident involving a nuclear missile in the near future? I think it's actually more likely than not. So we have the threat of avoiding the unintentional, accidental or intentional use of these 23.000 mostly hydrogen bombs in the world, any one of which could devastate a mid-sized city.

The third threat we face is the one we hear the most about, emergence of new states in the world. So in addition to the nine countries depicted here that have this 23.000 nuclear weapons, we worry that North Korea might acquire one. But the real danger is not that North Korea gets a nuclear weapon or uses it, it's what happens in the region. It would set off a chain reaction that could include Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan deciding to get nuclear weapons. It's even worse in the Middle East, where you can go in the Middle East from one nuclear weapon state, Israel, to a nuclear region with four or five nuclear weapon states and the unresolved economic, political, and religion differences. That's a recipe for nuclear war. That's the threat we face, if we just keep doing what we doing this is the world that will develop.

Finally there is a related threat of regime collapse, a high level panel to the UN Secretariat General warned years ago that we were on the verge of collapse. The regime collapse it would let loose a cascade of proliferation. The instruments are weak; the confidence in the regime is low. This regime needs to be not just strengthen but reinvented. We need new architectures to replace the architectures that were developed during the Cold War.

In addition to these threats that we face, we now have the strategic collapse. The previous administration identified the threat as the nexus of rogue states, terrorism, and WMD. Their answer was to go after hostile states. The solution was regime change. Iraq was the first implementation of this radical strategy; it was never intended to be the last. The strategy back fired. Not only did we attack the one country that didn't have nuclear weapons, but the countries that did have nuclear programs accelerated their efforts. Both Iran and North Korea have made more progress in the past five years than they made in the previous 15. The threat is worse as a result of this failed strategy. The failure is now widely recognized, though not by all. Many of the architects of this strategy continue to claim that it was in fact a success and urge us to continue with that, for example waging military strikes against Iran.

But, what you now see, particularly in the United States is an unprecedented shift of the strategic center of the United States, the security elite. People who built the nuclear empire are now saying that empire is obsolete and we have to take it down. This is epitomized by the four statesmen Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, two republicans, Sam Nunn, William Perry, two democrats who argue that we cannot continue to count on our good luck, that unless we change course we are entering a more dangerous nuclear world where it is unlikely that we would be as lucky as we were in the past 50 years. We will see weapons used, unless we change course, a change of course to move towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Not one of these men used to believe in this. Not one of them thought elimination was feasible or even desirable. They all do now. They all think it is an urgent policy priority to embrace the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and couple that with a series of practical steps of how to get there. They are not alone. They've been joined by multiple affects around the world. Similar statesmen have made

similar statements in the United Kingdom, in Germany, in Italy, in France; the European Union under the leadership of President Sarkozy put forth a very comprehensive non proliferation and disarmament plan. The United Kingdom under the leadership of Prime Minister Brown and former Minister Miliband has said that they wanted the United Kingdom to be a disarmament laboratory, to lead this effort to get rid of nuclear weapons. And of course UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has put forward a five point plan.

This momentum continues. In just the last few weeks we've seen the new Foreign Minister of Japan argue that we need a no first use policy. We've seen the Prime Minister of Japan embrace the Obama initiative for a world free of nuclear weapons. The Emperors of Japan has echoed that call. And just this weekend the new German government adopted a policy that calls for the US remove its nuclear weapons from Germany. Germany has never done this. We've had nuclear weapons in Germany for 50 years. Conservative colleges in Washington would argue that if we remove those weapons we would shake the NATO alliance to its core. Germany is not saying nonsense, take your nukes out.

This is part of a transformation that's occurring in the world today. So let's recapitulate. The threats are increasing. The previous doctrine has collapsed. A new strategic paradigm has emerged. New executive leaders have emerged. You can add to that budget pressure, as...it depends, budgets around the world start to shrink, why are we spending all this money on nuclear weapons we don't need? And finally, we have a crucial time period here. President Obama talks about the important decisions coming up in the next twelve months, I believe that is correct. We have twelve months, a policy window to work with here. The changes we make, that we want to make have to happen now. That is what the New York Times calls a watershed moment, and points that until our country, the United States, convincingly withdraws its own nuclear strategy and reduces its arsenals, we won't have the credibility or the political weight to confront these threats and I'm sure many people on this panel from other countries agree with that.

But here is the really interesting news, Obama and Medvedev agree with this. When they met in April they didn't talk about the other guys' nuclear weapons as in previous Russian-US statements have, they talked about their own obligations, their own responsibilities, their own commitment to achieving a nuclear free world and to proceed in a step by step process to back up their words, as they said, with bold actions. So in the April summit and in the July summit they have now put together a joint effort, a step by step process on how the US and Russia can take the lead in concretely reducing these weapons and implementing a number of crucial steps, for example the United States ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Russia assisting more enthusiastically in stopping the programs in Iran and North Korea. This is a matter of high priority to the President of the United States. His first policy speech, his first foreign policy speech he gave in Prague in April, and this is what he devoted it to.

Recording speech of Barack Obama: -...that we are destined to live in a world where more nations and more people possess the ultimate tools of destruction. Such fatalism is a deadly adversary for if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable. And just as we stood for freedom in the 20th century, we must stand together for the right of people everywhere to live free from fear in the 21st century. And as a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it. So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

Joseph Cirincione: -And he is serious about this. This is not just rather word for this man. He has a comprehensive policy that has three major components, they don't describe it this way but they should. Reduce, make concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. Prevent, stop new states from getting the bomb. And secure, block nuclear terrorism by securing and eliminating the bomb material terrorists would need. Reduce, prevent, secure a comprehensive multilevel approach that's moving at all

fronts at once. That is the only way to do this. You cannot rely on the old strategy of nuclear guacamole and trying to solve this one country at a time. We need a multidimensional, multinational policy to solve this global problem. He is now implementing this step by step. It's taking a while to get this up to speed, but it's a personal top priority for the President. He's hired some of the best staff in the country on this. The Vice-President of the United States is deeply engaged. Watch for him to make a stronger role for next year, particularly in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. He has now his top officials implementing a Nuclear Posture Review, engaged in talks with Russia just last weekend. Medvedev and Obama were on the phone again pushing that treaty forward, allies' consultations, more than we've seen in many years. Top US officials, including Susan Burk, are travelling the world racking up those frequent flyer miles, consulting with allies near and far on this entire agenda. And, of course, he is now using the Security Council in a new way, the way that was paved in the Bush administration with the passage of 1540, but now it is developed even further with the passage of 1887.

Just think about this, he went from a speech in Prague in April to codifying those tenets in an international law in an UN resolution in September quite rapid progress on this agenda. So is he the one? Is he the guy who is going to solve all this for us? Do we just have to seat back and applaud and watch all this movie ends? This is not a one man job. He says himself all the time, "I cannot do this by myself." It's up to all of us. And he faces some formidable obstacles. Number one, competing priorities, Afghanistan, health care, the economic crisis, anyone of these can suck attention away. I'm actually confident that we can overcome this. That by the time we need to be focusing national attention on this in the New Year we are going to have a health care bill, we are going to have decisions on Afghanistan. We are going to have an energy bill. We'll be able to get the top level leadership focused on this.

The second most serious obstacle is the nuclear Neanderthals, those people with a financial and ideological interest in the nuclear posture just the way it is. They don't want to change a thing and they are gearing up for a battle royale in the senate over the ratification of the START Treaty. The START Treaty, a fairly minor step, simply clarifying the reduction that the US and Russia already planned. Simply extending verification arrangements, but this is going to be a nuclear Gettysburg. This is where the forces of reaction are going to come and bring everything they've got to stop the President in his tracks. And it's not just about strategy, it's not just about policies, it is personal. They want to cripple the President of the United States. They want to portray him as weak, naïve, unconcerned with American security, maybe not even an American. They are taking everything they've got and they are going to use every issue they've got when the nuclear policy issue comes, national security interest will go by the wayside, political agendas will triumph.

But I think we can overcome that. I think this is a small and dying tribe. A more serious issue we have is internal divisions within the administration the people who believe in transformation and the people who want to take more incremental steps. Those struggles are more serious. And finally we have the societal situation, I think it's the greatest obstacle of all, cynicism, and may include some people in this room. We have white cynicism that does not believe that eliminating nuclear weapons is desirable, why would you do this? We have moderate cynicism that thinks that it's desirable but unachievable, we can't do this. We have the left cynicism that thinks it's achievable and desirable but the President is not up to it, the reports aren't good enough, the policies don't go far enough. All that cynicism sags the will and the strength of the supporters of eliminating nuclear weapons in a step by step process and makes it harder for us to do the job.

So we have to convince people that this is possible. So the organizing strategy that I have at Ploughshares Fund, that I urge all of us to adopt is to hit this window. Now is the time to give everything you've got to this, to unify our efforts, to develop the best expert analysis to counter the false claims of the other side, to mobilize your core constituency and then to expand that out and build political support. Unite the left and the center to counter the obstructionism of the right. Barack Obama understands this. He talked, you heard him, about the objectives that he has to achieve.

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This is the way it's going to unfold in the United States: we are going to have a Posture Review in the beginning of the year that we would reduce all the nuclear weapons, the START Treaty will be brought out to the Senate for ratification, in April we have an unprecedented global nuclear security summit, 34 heads of state for the first time will gather in Washington to work on securing and reducing nuclear materials around the world. We have to start to work on the next treaty; the START Treaty is just a down payment. We need to get the US and Russia working on the next treaty, put serious reductions down to a thousand weapons each. We have to make the NPT Review Conference a success. That is an agreed document that strengthens the Treaty in all its aspects. We have to have a Senate to ratify the Test Ban Treaty; I think that we have a good shot at that by midyear 2010. And, of course, in all of this we have to contain Iranian and North Korean programs and be working to resolve the underlying conflicts that could rise to the proliferation imperative.

Obama says that he knows a call to arms can stir the souls of men and women more than a call to lay them down, we all know this to be true. We are warriors for peace. We are not rallying our nations to war; we are rallying them to negotiations. It is my pleasure to be here with you today to add my voice for peace and progress to the voices in this room. Thank you very much.

Irma Arguello: -Thank you very much Joe. This was an excellent presentation, as the ones before. And now we have some questions from the participants. We will be organized like that: those who want to ask a question can ask for permission to speak, identify themselves, and direct the question to the panelist to whom its intended. Who would like to break the ice? Let's see, Alfredo. Oh... I'm sorry, there.

Participant (male): -Mr. Cirincione, my question is for you. My name is Marcos, I am a Commander, Brazilian Navy, retired, Master Degree student from the Universidade do Estado de Rio de Janeiro, International Relations. I am gonna ask it in Portuguese. My question is: Some weeks ago, looking for the "National Security Strategy" at the website of the White House and of the Department of Defense of the United States, which is a high-level normative document developed by the American President, and among its specifications, it has the policy of use of the American nuclear weapon arsenal. In that context, as Mr. Cirincione presented very clearly, the changes applied by president Obama in the website of the National Security Strategy have not appeared in either of both sites. They have disappeared, they are not available anymore. The only available strategy is the old one, stated in 2006 by the Bush administration. So my question in this context of changes is what are the guarantees on the use of the American arsenal for non nuclear weapon states independantly of the efforts made by the Obama Administration on the START treaty negotiations. Which is the most important document where the American Government states the use and policy over nuclear weapons?

Joseph Cirincione: -It is a peculiar aspect of the transition of government in the United States that we actually go for quite a period of time without a new strategy. So you would have to say that the operative document, as far as the Department of Defense is concerned, is still the Nuclear Posture Review conducted by the Bush administration back in 2002. There is also something called the National Security Strategy that was last done by the Bush administration. That one, technically, is still operative. But the Obama administration will produce a new Nuclear Posture Review and a new National Security Strategy, and these will all be presented formally at the beginning of the New Year. The way they want it to work is that they will present the budget around January and then all the reviews, the Nuclear Posture Review, what they call the Quadrennial Defense Review. And there is a Missile Defense Review that's coming up as well. And all these will be presented. President Obama has made very clear in his speech at the United Nations on September 23rd that he wants the new Nuclear Posture Review to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and to open the door to deep reductions in those weapons. I have every confidence that it will do that. The question is how far it will go, how much it will reduce the role. I would like it to reduce it to the only legitimate role for nuclear weapons that I see, and that is to prevent their use. To be used to respond or to deter a nuclear attack by others. I will tell you honestly, there is conflict in the administration over this. Some want to retain a posture of nuclear ambiguity. Would we or wouldn't we

use it? We want to maintain the role for responding to a chemical or biological attack with nuclear weapons. I think that would be a mistake. But that is the debate that's going on, it is unresolved. I don't know how deep the reductions that would be given in the Posture Review are. Quite frankly, just so you know, right now the struggle is whether this document will present the President with a number of options, which is what he's asked for, or if it would give him options and a recommendation.

The President does not want to be put in a position where the Department of Defense is giving him a recommendation that he has to accept or reject. So that's the struggle. You watch in January, if you see that it is options with no recommendations it will be a sign of how strong this President actually is.

Irma Arguello: -Alfredo.

Alfredo Labbé: -Thank you. I would like to thank all the panel members for their excellent presentations. In a certain way, you placed in front of us complementary aspects and emphasized on different things that I think are very important when it comes to planning a truly effective campaign to terminate nuclear weapons. I would like to thank Ambassador González Gálvez, for reminding us something that non-nuclear-weapons states usually forget when we analyze the Treaty from the point of view of its symmetry and equilibrium. Or better yet, of its lack of symmetry. We hear, mostly in the Non-Aligned Movement, a constant political claim against an instrument that perpetuates the disequilibrium and grants certain countries with the privilege of legitimacy in the possession, for a period, of a defense mean that is, by its own nature, irresistible. And however, you remind us that nonproliferation or assuming the status of a non-nuclear-weapon state obeys to an end itself, and it comes from what it is unacceptable, that is, the nuclear weapon as a legitimate mean of defense. So, when you remind us this aspect, you give us an important conceptual element to reject. Or better yet, not to reject the argument of asymmetry, or disequilibrium, or privilege, but to say what are we looking for – and that is why it's necessary to preserve the Treaty, as a juridical good, a superior public good. I thank you for that Ambassador. Now, I would like to address this observation to Joseph. It has to do with the debate surrounding the need of nuclear weapons and it is the debate behind, I believe, the formulation of the next NPR. I believe that there is something fateful about the nuclear deterrence. The nuclear deterrence created a trap and the states that rely on nuclear deterrence are trapped, and you presented a wonderful final image which spoke volumes, this connection between Obama and the Matrix. I suppose the states that follow in the trap of nuclear deterrence are like Frodo in the last scene of the third of the Lord of the Rings films, looking at the ring and deciding to keep the ring. But in order to be free from this trap you need time. And the time needed is the time to decide whether you are going to retaliate against a perceived nuclear attack. And that's why we, and when I say we is Chile, and the other members of the coalition de-alerting believe that de-alerting is the mother of all practical steps. So going forward with de-alerting will provide precious time. Not to think about the precise data indicating to you in a certain stage that there is a massive nuclear attack against your country, but precious time to start thinking about the inherited madness of nuclear deterrence. And that is very important. Do you believe that President Obama will be able, willing he is, we know, but will he be able to fulfill his promises as candidate regarding de-alerting? This is something that he mentioned at the debate of the Arms Control Association in Washington. He has not repeated those concepts later as President. What do you think he can do really in terms of de-alerting? Thank you.

Joseph Cirincione: -Thank you. And by the way, I often think about that Frodo image with nuclear weapons. [with humor] We are very reluctant to let this power go, even though we know it's the only way we can save ourselves, very reluctant. And it's going to take a journey to get us to that point. This is going to take a lot of struggle to get us to the point when we left that ring go. As far as I know, the Nuclear Posture Review is not addressing de-alerting. I may be wrong about this, but there's been no indication of it. It hasn't been the subject of any of the briefings I've been involved with. It may be that they feel that they can only address this in the next treaty with Russia; that this has to be something

mutual. I disagree with that. I think this is something we can achieve easily, for those who don't know the United States and Russia each keep about 1500 hydrogen bombs on long range missiles and bombers ready to launch in about 15 minutes notice. So it's still the Cold War posture. This is, of course, completely insane. There is no justification for this other than the fact that this is the way it's been for several decades. I know the President promised he would do this. As far as I know, however, it is not one of the first steps he's going to take. Maybe we'll be pleasantly surprised.

Yury Yudin: -United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. My question to the panel is: what will be considered as a success for the next year NPT Review Conference?

Joseph Cirincione: -What is success? How do you define success for the NPT? I have a simple one sentence definition which is: adoption by a consensus of a document that strengthens the NPT in all its aspects, disarmament, non proliferation, and peaceful use. The model for this is 1995 and 2000. 2005 was the failure model.

Rebecca Johnson: -I'd like to go a little bit beyond the one sentence and think about how we might get there. For me it's not only the adoption of a document, but it's also what's in that document and whether in adopting the document there is also a mechanism either adopted or understood sufficiently that will pursue implementation. Because the fact is, for many, the adoption of the final document in 2000 was such a major success. This was substantive. Not only the 13 steps on nuclear disarmament that I referenced earlier, but also a host on security and safety and Additional Protocol kind of issues, yet within a short space of time the ink was barely dry and some countries -at this particular point it was France and then Russia- began to actually roll back on some to what they had committed and by 2005 it lay in tatters. So it's not enough to get the right issues on paper. It is necessary to have the political will somehow also imbedded. And this is why I argue of the impractical terms. In the four weeks of the NPT there will, inevitably, have to be a review of what's happened till now. This is going to be very contentious. There is going to be disagreement, have you done enough?, etc. But my argument is that to separate out the commitments we need to go forward. Adopt those, either as a document or as a series of decisions that happened in 1995 or indeed even resolutions. Because this will at least put down what the intentions are. And then have the mechanisms to implement them.

Rolf Ekéus: -... Follow up, certainly, your question was about success. I mean one thing is to get the document, maybe, ready in the spirit of compromise to reach success. But I think if you look upon the substance of such a document, it must move, I refer to what Ambassador González was talking about at length, to restore balance. The document must restore the balance which was intended in the very beginning when at least a large portion of the present membership signs up on it, because they had been cheated on the implementation of article 6. Very little has been done and of course there's very serious responsible government among the non nuclear weapon states, obviously they don't want to break the Treaty. They are concerned, the like the minimal to save the Treaty because it is a grand risk to have it totally ignored. But what is important now is to get steps to restore the balance. That means real commitment by... Of course, we are very happy to hear President Obama likes to hear commitments with other nuclear weapon state parties to the treaty. I will not reckon a success if you don't get commitment in addition, I mean, I think it's pathetic to say we have a document. I think we need substance in that document and it should restore the balance.

Irma Arguello: -Thank you. We have three things ahead of us in the next five minutes. First the last question. Then a staff member of the Correios will make an announcement, and finally we're going to have a break. I give the word to Paulo Barretto.

Participant (male): -Paulo Barretto, consultant. My question is to Ms. Johnson. You mentioned in the last part of your presentation the Nuclear Weapons Convention, so my question is, could you elaborate

more on your vision, concept of this Convention? And what would be the role of the big five in the Convention?

Rebecca Johnson: -Thank you. How long do we have? I'll try to do it very briefly. I see a Nuclear Weapon Convention in the way that the Chemical Weapon Convention or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or indeed other treaties. If you want to eliminate and abolish and prohibit a weapon system you need to have the legal instrument to do it. That needs to codify the prohibition. And on this I think that if you like a down payment on confidence, a pre negotiation step would actually be to take the use of nuclear weapons all together out of acceptable practice, to reduce the role of the doctrine to the extent that in fact there is an understanding in that any use of nuclear weapon by a country or, of course, by a terrorist would be a crime against humanity.

That the entire international community would be responsible for trying to prevent such a thing, which is the negative security insurance being expanded, and that the entire international community would be responsible for helping any country so threaten or attacked but also to bring to justice the perpetrator and anyone who has supplied and enabled the perpetrator. Now, again taking the lead of the chemical and biological weapons, banning the use, or at least enforcing in law a taboo on the use, was an early step before you got to the much more complicated negotiations on the treaty. Now the treaty would have to prohibit the use, legally, the manufacturing, the possession, the transfer, etc. It would have to co-define how the countries currently possessing would eliminate the nuclear weapons they have as safely and securely as possible. It would have to co-define how you would engage with nuclear technology, the peaceful purposes in such a way it could not be used for military purposes.

Set a timetable of positive obligations, prohibitions and mechanisms to achieve this. This cannot be done overnight, but no treaties are done overnight. You start with a framework that sets the goal of the abolition and you then put into the treaty how this would be achieved technically, politically, legally in terms of verification, and also if necessary in terms of regional arrangements, and so on. So much of this has been discussed in a draft that civil society, myself included in the original draft, put together what has been put in the UN by Costa Rica and Malaysia. Nobody is saying that's the treaty to negotiate. That's a resource to look at for some of the questions and problems that will have to be navigated. The important thing is to put the concept that a treaty, or framework treaty, a Nuclear Weapons Convention, or a nuclear weapon provision treaty, who cares how you call it? It's a concept, has gotten out to be embedded and I think that the 2010 is where we need to start that process. Thank you.

Irma Arguello: -Thank you, Rebecca. Well, with this we finish our session. I want to ask for applause for all of the excellent panelists we've had with us.

Applause

