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Iran's Enrichment Capabilities Raise Controversies Print E-mail
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Global Security Online, 24 Apr 2009.

The likelihood of Iran’s reaching its "Breakout Capability", that is, that the country has gathered enough weapon grade fissile to potentially manufacture its first nuclear bomb, has became a controversial issue among experts.

Facts

1.-

Last February 19 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - issued a report produced by its General Director, Mohamed ElBaradei, in relation to Iran's nuclear activities. The report [1] stated that the country had already produced over a tonne of low-enriched uranium.

According to the report, Iran had continued expanding its uranium enrichment capacity to a total of 4,000 centrifuges operating in cascades in the Natanz plant called FEP (Fuel and Enrichment Plant) and about 1,500 more had been installed and were soon to be incorporated to the process.

2.-

On the basis of this information, David Albright and Jacqueline Shire from the Institute of Science and International Security- ISIS, published a report [2] on the same month which asserted that Iran had reached the capacity to construct an atomic bomb given that, according to the authors, the uranium hexafluoride stock available to Iran was equivalent to 700 kg of low-enriched uranium, a sufficient amount to make the nuclear artifact.

Indeed, it is possible to produce 25 kg of enriched uranium to 90% starting from 700kg of low-enriched uranium if these are processed in ultracentrifuges connected in cascade.

3.-

A little later, on March 2, a report by Kemp and Glaser from Princenton University denied that Iran had reached its "Breakout Capability"[ 3]. According to the arguments put forward by the authors, the 1,010 kg of uranium hexafluoride accounted for in the IAEA report would represent 25 kg of enriched uranium to 90%, or in military terms, an amount enough, theoretically, to construct a nuclear bomb, Hiroshima type, if the process was carried out without “losses”.

However, Kemp and Glaser assert that Iran does not possess the necessary technology to produce highly enriched uranium because in order to achieve it, it should modify its centrifuges or process the uranium at least two times more in the current cascades, which would delay about 3 years the production of this amount of fissile material for military uses.

Finally, they explained that such an amount should at least be doubled to take into account the intrinsic inefficiency of the artifact.

4.-

In response to this last report, David Albright and Jacqueline Shire published a new article [4] on March 18 where they pointed out, among other things, that Glaser and Kemp had not taken into account in their calculations the clandestine facilities that produce highly enriched uranium in a more efficient way.

According to these authors, after a threat of bombing its nuclear plants, Iran could have decided to build secret facilities in case Natanz was destroyed. They added that the report by Princenton University overestimates the enrichment capacity of the Natanz plant. Moreover, Albright, Shire and Brannan argued that if it was necessary for Iran to modify its centrifuge cascades, this would take no more than 6 months.

5.-Glaser and Kemp replied Albright and Shire’s criticism [5], and supported their position by pointing out that there cannot be taken into account speculations about alleged clandestine facilities, because if they were assumed as existing,  facilities "could be of any size and could produce HEU directly from natural uranium”.


Comment

It is natural that controversies raise among experts mostly if they are related to such sensitive matters, like Iran's "breakout capability", but it is extremely important that political decisions derived from those analysis are made with responsibility, and a reasonable level of accuracy, which usually implies to listen different perspectives.

In this sense, it is essential that scientific community around the world get involved in global security issues, providing governments their views and opinions, even when opposite. And it is wise for governments to promote such debates. The exchange of ideas among experts regarding highly sensitive international issues let decision makers acquire a wider perspective, which help them minimize risks of regrettable choices.

References:

1.- IAEA, GOV/2009/8, IAEA, 19 Feb 2009.

2.- IAEA Report on Iran, ISIS Report, David Albright y Jacqueline Shire, 19 Feb 2009.

3.- Statement on Iran´s ability to make a nuclear weapon and the significance of the 19 February 2009 AIEA report on Iran’s Uranium-enrichment program, Princeton University, Scott Kemp, Alexander Glaser, 2 Mar 2009.

4.- Nuclear Weapon Breakout Scenarios: Correcting the Record, ISIS Report, David Albright, Paul Brannan y Jacqueline Shire, 2 Mar 2009.

5.- Response to criticisms by ISIS, Princeton University, Scott Kemp, Alexander Glaser, Mar 2009.

 
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